CIA/OCI/BRIEF 099-75 27 JUNE 1975

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MIDDERULE EAST AFRICA BRIEF 099-75-4

ON THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION ON WEDNESDAY OPENS A NEW PHASE IN HER FIGHT TO STAY IN OFFICE. THUS FAR, THE PROCLAMATION OF A STATE OF EMERGENCY HAS RESULTED IN NO SIGNIFICANT DISTURBANCES IN POLITICALLY VOLATILE URBAN AREAS. THE

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RIGURS AND CARNOS HTO HOO BHT HOO DAAH OF ZITABDNOPZBRROD

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A HOUR DALL ZAH YADEZANDAU TXAN NIDAB OT TRAMAVON

GAH THONAD .ZRM YADEZANDAU DALIOVA YJULI SAAY A RAVO ROP

FOR OVER A YAR CAREFULLY AVOIDED TAKING DRAYIC SAAY A RAVO AOL

O' GALINST TZOMARO RAH ZA HOUZ JULI ZOPPC SHT TZNIADA

O' GALINST TALOMA ZAH ONOMA ZAH OHU LNAYARAN

TO CARRY OFF HER LATEST MOVE, MRS. GANDHI NEEDS THE BACKING OF HER RULING CONGRESS PARTY. SO FAR, WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE THAT SUPPORT HAS DWINDLED BY A SIGNIFICANT DEGREE. MRS. GANDHI'S HEMOST LIKELY SUCCESSORS, AGRICULTURE MINISTER RAM OR FINANCE

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MINISTER CHAVAN, ARE STILL GIVING HER STRONG PUBLIC SUPPORT.

ON WEDNESDAY SIX LONG-STANDING CONGRESS PARTY MAVERICKS IN

PARLIAMENT WERE SUSPENDED, FROM THE PARTY AND, SEVERAL WERE ARRESTED.

THE CONGRESS LEADERSHIP IS IN NO MOOD TO TOLERATE OPEN DISSENT

WITHIN THE RANKS.Y

LEADERS OF THE ARMED FORCES REPORTEDLY WERE NOT FOREWARNED
ABOUT THE EMERGENCY PROCLAMATION. THE MILITARY IS RELUCTANT TO
INTERVENE IN CIVIL DISORDERS, AND MRS. GANDHI PROBABLY DOES NOT
ANTICIPATE CALLING ON THE ARMY TO ASSIST IN MAINTAINING PUBLIC
ORDER UNLESS THE SITUATION DETERIORATES DRASTICALLY. POLICE
AND PARAMILITARY FORCES HAVE EXPANDED CONSIDERABLY IN THE LAST
FEW YEARS, AND THEY PROBABLY CAN CONTROL ANY PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS
THAT RESULT FROM THE CRACKDOWN. YO

IT APPEARS UNLIKELY THAT MRS. GANDHI WILL RECONVENE

PARLIAMENT IN JULY FOR ITS USUAL SUMMER SESSION. SHE MUST. HOWEVER.

UNDER THE TERMS OF INDIAN LAW. GAIN APPROVAL OF THE EMERGENCY

PROCLAMATION BY BOTH HOOZES OF PARLIAMATION WILL EXPIRE. BEXCONVEIVABLY.

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MRS- GANDHI MIGHT STRETCH THIS TIMETAB	O mentes #
PARLIAMENT AND CALLING FOR A NEW ELECT	rion, which need not be
HELD FOR SIX MONTHS. THIS WOULD GIVE H	HER TIME TO REPAIR HER
REPUTATION WITHIN THE PARTY AND THROUGH	SH THE NATION- IN A
SPEECH TO THE NATION WEDNESDAY, THE PR	RIME MINISTER SAID SHE
WOULD SOON BE TAKING FURTHER MEASURES	TO STRENGTHEN THE ECONOMY
AND REMOVE THE HARDSHIPS NOW BEING VIS	Y-ZNAIDNI YNAM NOGU DETIZ
THE SUPREME COURT IS EXPECTED TO E	BEGIN ITS REVIEW OF MRS.
GANDHIB'S APPEAL OF A LOWER COURT CONV	VICTION FOR CAMPAIGN
VIOLATIONS SHORTLY AFTER JULY 14. A JL	JDGMENT MIGHT BE ISSUED LONG
BEFORE AN ELECTION COULD BE HELD. THE	EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE
GOVERNMENT, DESPITE THE EXTENSIVE POWE	ERS GRANTED IT UNDER THE
NEW EMERGENCY PROCLAMATION, CANNOT BLO	OCK THE SUPREME COURTHE'S
CONSIDERATION OF THE APPEAL (CONFIDENT	TIAL DOM
で、して、多イルノのファ 国語 - 国別は国別国別関係国際国別国別国和RMED CLASHES BET	TWEEN LEBANESE AND FEDAYEEN
RADICALS AND LEBANESE SECURITY FORCES	RESUMED IN BEIRUT ON TUES-
DAY AFTER THREE WEEKS OF RELATIVE CALM	1. THE RIGHT-WING PHALANGES
PARTY SUBMMEMBERS HAS SO FAR NOT BEECO	OME HEAVILY INVOLVED IN
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THE FIGHTING, WHICH HAS LEFT DEAD AT LEAST 45-4

A CEASE-FIRE NEGOTIATED ON JUNE 25 HAS BEEN GENERALLY RESPECTED BY THE MAJOR LEBANESE POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE LARGE FEDAYEEN GROUPS-WIT HAS BEEN DISREGARDED, HOWEVER, BY LEBANESE AND MEDAYEEN RADICALS, THE SAME GROUPS THAT PLAYED A CENTRAL ROLF IN THE FIGHTING DURING APRIL AND MAY.Y

PHALANGIST LEADERS HAVE CHARGED THAT "EXTREME LEFTISTS" BACKED BY LIBYA INTENSIFIED THE FIGHTING THIS WEEK IN HOPES OF BROVOKING CENERAL HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THE PHALANGISTS AND THE PALESTINIANS. THE PHALANGISTS HAVE ABSOLVED FATAH, THE LARGEST FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATION, OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CURRENT CLASHES.Y

PRIVATELY THAT FATAH UNITS HAVE IN FACT BEEN FIGHTING WITH THE SECURITY SERVICES AGAINST FEDAYEEN FROM THE "REJECTION FRONT." IF TRUE, THIS WOULD CONFIRM THAT FATAH CHIEF YASIR ARAFAT SEES THE RADICALS' ACTIONS AS A THREAT'TO HIM, AS WELL AS TO LEBANON, AND THAT HE IS NOW WILLING TO TAKE MORE FORCEFUL STEPS THAN BEFORE IN ATTEMPTING TO CHONTROL THE SMALL FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS. Y

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IN AN UNPRECEDENTED MOVE TO DISSOCIATE FATAH AND THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION FROM THE VIOLENCE, ARAFAT APPEARED ON LEBANESE TELEVISION AND RADIO ON JUNE 25 TO APPEAL TO "BLEBANESE AND PALESTINIANS TO LIVE TOGETHER IN HARMONY." HE SAID HE HAD REACHED AGREEMENT WITH PRESIDENT FRANJIYAH THAT THE PALESTINIANS WOULD RESPECT LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY AND THAT LEBANON, IN TURN, WOULD RESPECT THE PALESTINIANS' RIGHT TO EXIST IN LEBANON.Y

THE MARXIST-ORIENTED POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE-THE LARGEST OF THE RADICAL FEDAYEEN GROUPS-HAS DENOUNCED ARAFAT-S CALL FOR A CEASE-FIRE AND HAS ACCUSED HIM OF ABANDONING THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE - 早月四周期间期间期间周围间间间间间间间间间隔隔离图题

THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN ARAFAT AND FRANJIYAH IS A REAFFIRMATION OF FORMAL AGREEMENTS NEGOTIATED BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND THE FEDAYEEN IN 1969 AND 1973. IT WAS REACHED AT A MEETING BETWEEN ARAFAT AND FRANJIYAH ON JUNE 23-THEIR FIRST IN OVER A MONTH-Y

UNITED AFAT, UHO HAS PREFERRED TO STAY ON THE SIDELINES DURING THE PRESENT ROUND OF TROUBLES, WAS URGED TO MEET WITH DATE:

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FRANJIYAH BY EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT SADAT. SADAT HAS RECENTLY BEEN

CALLING ON ALL SIDES TO MAKE THE CONCESSIONS NECESSARY TO FORM

A NEW GOVERNMENT. IN A PRESS INTERVIEW ON WEDNESDAY, THE EGYPTIAN

LEADER INDIRECTLY CRITICIZED THE PALESTINIANS BY SUGGESTING THAT

"ELEMENTS THAT ENCROACH ON THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LEBANON" MUST

BEAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COUNTRY DIFFICULTIES. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. / /UZSR-SYRIA: SOVIET PARMTY SECRETARY PMONOMAREMY'S VISIT TO SYRIA, WHICH ENDED WEDNESDAY, MAY HAVE BEEN RUMMINIMATELATED TO SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON LAST WEEK.

PONOMAREV PLAYS AN ACTIVE ROLE IN SOVIET MIDDLE EAST MATTERS, AND HIS VISIT COULD HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO BUCK UP SYRIAN RESISTANCE TO WASHINGTON, AS WELL AS TO OBTAIN A READING ON KHADDAM'S CONVERSATIONS WITH SEUCRETARY KISSINGER. ALTHOUGH PONOMAREVUM WAS OBBSTENSIBLY IN SYRIA OWNLY TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION WITH THE BAATH PARMTY, THE PRESENCE OF THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVE TO THE GENEVA MIDDLE EAST PEACHE CONFERENCE INDICATEMS THAT BROADER POLITICAL ISSUES WERE ALSO DISCUSSED.//Y

//PHONOMAREV SEEMED DEFENSIVE ABOUT THE IMPACT ON US-SOVIET

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DETENTE ON MOSCOW'S RELATIONS WITH THE ARABS. IN AN	O PERCES 45
OVER SYRIAN TELEVISION, HE ARGUED THAT DETENTE WAS	-NI WETON
CONSISTENT WITH MOSCOW'S SUPPORT FOR SYRIA AND THE	ARABS, BUT
INSTEAD SHOULD BE VIEWED AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE	"STRUGGLE
AGAINST IMPERIALISM."//Y	
//IN RECENT WEEKS, THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER USGGEST	TAHT ZNOI
SOVBIET-SYRIAN RELATIONS ARE TROUBLED. THE SOVIETS	PROBABLY
SHARE THE CONCERN OF SYRIAN COMMUNIST PARTY CHIEF B	AKDASH RE-
GARDING CRITICISM OF SYRIA'S RECENT GRANT OF OFFSHO	RE OIL-
PROSPECTING RIGHTS TO A US COMPANU. THE SOVIETS HAV	E NOT COMMENTED
ON THIS THEMSELVES, BUT THEY PRESUMABLY FEAR THAT I	T COULD LEAD
TO FURTHER SYRIAN ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION MAND TO I	DUNDCREASED
FCONOMIC DEALINGS HITTH THE HEST IN ADDITION. THE A	CTTON UNDERCUTS

PONOMAREV APPARENTLY DID NOT HAVE GREAT SUCCESS IN SOOTHING
THE SYRIANS. HE SPENT MOSTO OF HIS TIME WITH SECONDARY FIGURES.
MEETING ONLY ONCE WITH ASAD. AND HIS VISIT RECEIVED LITTLE

THE MONOPOLY THE SOVIETS AND THERIR EAST EUROPEAN ALLIES HAVE

HERETOFORE HAD ON OIL EXPLORATION IN SYRIA.//Y

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ATTENTION FROM THE SYRIAN PRESS. A SOVIET COMMENTATOR CHARACTERIZED THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE TRIP AS ONE OF "FRANKNESS AND CORDIAL UNDERSTANDING"--A EUPHEMISM FOR TOUGH TALK. WHATEVER THEIR CURRENT DIFFERENCES, IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT MOSCOW AND SYRIA WILL LET THEIR RELATIONS BECOME SHEVERELY STRAINED BECAUSE EACH NEEDS THE OTHER TOO MUCH. CONFIDENTIAL HERMON/Y

4. SPANISH SAHARA: RELATIONS BETWEEN ALGERIA AND MOROCCO HAVE BECOME FURTHER STRAINED OVER THE SPANISH SAHARA ISSUE.

THE FRICTION IS COMPLICATING SPAINAR'S EFFORTS TO ARRANGE GUADRIPARTITE TALKS WITH MOROCCO, MAURITANIA, AND ALGERIA TO DISCUSS THE FUTURE OF THE TERRITORY.

IN A RECENT SPEECH, ALGERIAN PRESIDENT BOUMEDIENE REITERATED
HIS SUPPORT FOR SELF-DETERMINATION FOR SPANISH SAHARA AND
CHALLENGED MOROCCO AND MAURITANIA TO ADMIT PUBLICLY THEIR
INTENTIONS TO ANNEX OR PARTITION THE TERRITORY. HIS POINTED
REMINDER THAT ALGIERS IS MADDANTHÉ MECCA OF REVOLUTIONARIES?
WAS PROBABLY A WARNING TO RABAT THAT THERE ARE STILL MOROCCAN
DISSIDENTS RESIDING IN ALGERIA.4

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BOUMEDIENE'S REMARKS PRODUCED SHARP CRITICISM IN RABAT. THE SEMIOFFICIAL AND OPPOSITION PRESS BOTH CONDEMNED BOUMEDIENE FOR INTERFERING IN "PURELY MOROCCAN-MAURITANIAN AFFAIRS."

RABAT ALSO REJECTED ALGERIA'S RECENT INVITATION TO MOROCCAN
AND MAURITANIAN POLITICAL PARTIES FOR TALKS IN ALGIERS ON SPANISH
SAHARA. THE MOROCCANS VIEW THE INVITATION AS AN ATTEMPT TO
OUTMANEUVER KING HASSAN BY SPLITTING THE PALACE AND THE OPPOSITION
PARTIES ON THE SAHARA QUESTION. AS A RESULT, MOROCCO WILL BE
MORE OPPOSED THAN EVER TO ALGERIA'S INCLUSION IN ANY NEGOTIATIONS
ON SPANTSH SAHARA.Y

MEANUHILE, MOROCCOD'S CONTINUING MILITARY PROBES INTO SPANISH SAHARA, DESIGNED TO INCREASE PRESSURE ON MADRID TO NEGOTIATE WITH RABAT, MAY INSTEAD PROVOKE A HARSH SPANISH REACTION. FIVE SPANISH SOLDIERS WERE KILLED ON JUNE 24 WHEN THEIR VEHICLE HIT AN ANTITANK MINE IN THE VICINITY OF AN EARLIER MOROCCAN INCURSION IN NORTHWESTERN SPANISH SAHARA. THE NEXT DAY, ACCORDING TO THE SPANISH PRESS, TWO SPANISH AIR FORCE PLANES FLYING A RECONNAISSANCE MISSION OVER THE SPANISH SAHARA WERE FIRED ON BY MOROCCAN TROOPS

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WITH ANTIAIRCRAFT MACHINE GUNS - A SPANISH ARMY UNIT REPORTEDLY

ENGAGED THE MOROCCAN TROOPS IN AN EXCHANGE OF MORTAR FIRE UNTIL

THE MOROCCANS WITHDREW - NO SPANISH CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED
BUT THE SPANISH AIRCRAFT MAY HAVE BEEN HIT - Y

DESFITE MOROCCAN PROTESTATIONS THAT SAHARAN INSURGENTS

WERE RESPONSIBLE, MADRID WILL BLAME RABAT AND MAY NOW SHOW LESS

CONCERN ABOUT MOROCCAN INTERESTS IN THE SAHARA. THE INCIDENTS

MAY ALSO INCREASE SPAIN'S DESIRE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE TERRITORY.

CONFIDENTIAL

S. BAHRAIN: ONE JUNE 23, BAHRAIN'S RULER, EMIR ISA, APRUPTLY RECESSED THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY UNTIL OCOTOBER. THE RECESS DECREE—COMING EIGHT MONTHS AFTER THE OPENIONNG OF THE SESSION AND AS DU SOON AS IT WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE—WAS APPARENTLY IS—SUED BECAUSE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ANNOYANCE OVER HAVING FAILED TO GET THE LEGISLATORS TO AGREE TO AN ACCEPUTABLE COMPROMISE ON A CONTROVERSIAL SECURITY MEASURE. THE SECURITY MEASURE IM—BROGLIO IS ONLY THE LATEST EMPHISODE IN THE CONTEST THE LUEGIS—LATURE HAS BEEN WAGING TO EXPAND ITS POLITICAL INFLUENCE AT THE

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LAST OCTOBER, BEFORE THE OPENING OF THE ASSEMBLY, EMIR ISA
PROMULGATED THE SECURITY MEASURE. EMIRI DECREES HAVE THE FORCE
OF LAW IF ISSUMED WHEN THE LEGISLATURE IS NOT IN SESSION; THEY
REMAIN IN FORCE UNTIL THE LEGISLATURE ACTS ON THEM. ALTHOUGH
THE NEW SECURITY MEASURE REPLACED A MUCH TOUGHER 1945 LAW WHICH
HAD BEEN USED TO ROUND UP AND DETAIN 27 LEFTIST AGITATORS EARLIER
IN 1974, IT WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED BY THE SMALL BAND OF ASSEMBLY
LEFTISTS. BY MAY, OPPONENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT HAD PRIED THE
SECURITY MEASURE OUT OF COMMITTEE WITH A "DO NOT PASS" RECOMMENDATION. THE GOVERNMENT DECIDED NOT TO RISK A VOTE IN THE 44-MEMBER ASSEMBLY, EVEN THOUGH IT CONTROLS THE VOTES OF THE 14 MEMBERS TO KEEP THE SECURITY DECREE FROM BEING DEFEATED."

ALTHOUGH THE LEFTISTS DID NOT ACCOMPLISH THE DEFENAT OF
THE SECURIMINATY MEASURE, THEY CLEARLY OURTPOINTED THE GOVERNMENT.
THE GOVERNMENT'S DINSISTENCE ON SECRET SESSIONS, AND THE EMIR'S
RECESS OF THE ASSEMBLY BEFORE MOST MEMBERS WISHED TO ADJOURN.

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MAKE IT LOOK ARBITRARY IN THE PUBLIC EYE. ON THE OTHER HANND,
THE GOVERNMENT NOW HAS A FOUR MONTH RESPITE IN WHICH TO LINE
UP SUPPORT QUIETLY AMONG THE LEGISLATORS FOR AN ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE SECURITY MEASURE BY THE TIME THE ASSEMBLY RECONVENDINES
IN OCTOBER. (CONFIDENTIAL)

6. DAHOMEY: PRESIDENT KEREKOU, WHO NARROWLY WEATHERED A
COUP ATTEMPT LAST JANUARY, IS BEING BUSFFETED BY ANOTHER POLITICAL STORM THAT COULD RESULT IN HIS OUSTER-4

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PRESIDENT TOURE-Y

FOLLOWING THE NEWS OF AKIPE'S DEATH, CROWDS RAMPAGED IN

COTONOU AND OTHE, TOWNS., THEY FREED SOME PROMINENT POLITICAL DE
TAINETES, ND CLASHED WITH SECURITY FORCES WHO SHOT BACK KILLING

AN UNKINOWN NUMBER OF PERSONS. THE COUNTRY'S STRONG TEACHERS

UNION

THE GOVERNMENT HAS COUNTERED BY IMPOSING A COUNTRYWIDE CURFESSION AND ORDERING TROOPS TO SHOOT AT ANYONE

ZUZPICIOUZ.Y

KEREKOU HAS BEEN IN A WEAK POSITION SINCE LAST JANUARY'S UNSUCCESSFUL COUP ATTEMPT MBY A MODERATE CABINET MINISTER WHICH LEFT THE PRESIDENT MORE VULNERABLE TO MANEUVERING BY HIS RADICAL COLLEAGUES. AIKPE, ONE OF THE REGIME'S LEADING RADICALS AND A KEY OFFICER BEHIND THE MILITARY COUP THAT BROUGHT KEREKOU TO POWER IN OCTOBER 1972, IS KNOWN TO HAVE HARBORED AMMBITIONS TO REPLACE KEREKOU. IT IS UNCLEAR, HOWEVER, IF HE MWAS CLOSE TO MAKING A BID FOR POWER WHEN HE WAS KILLED.

THE STRONGEST FIGURE IN THE GOVERNMENT MAY NOW BE THE

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USSR: IN TIME OF WAR, SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV WILL BÉCOME THE SUPREME COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES, ACCORDING TO A SOVIET MILITARY OFFICER ON

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THE OFFICER RECENTLY SAID THAT DEFENSE MINISTER GRECHKO IS NOW COMMANDER IN CHIEF AND WOULD REMAIN SO AS LONG AS THE SOVIET UNION IS NOT AT WAR. HE WENT ON TO STATE, HOWEVER, THAT IN THE EVENT OF WAR BREZHNEV WOULD FOLLOW STALIN'S EXAMPLE AND ASSUME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES, BE-COMING CHAIRMAN OF THE STAVKA 1THE WARTIME ORGANIZA-TION OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERS WHICH CON-STITUTES THE SUPREME HIGH COMMAND: 4

THIS NEW INFORMATION IS CONSISTENT WITH REPORTS PROVIDED BY HIGH-RANKING SOVIET OFFICERS IN THE MID-LOS, SHORTLY AFTER KHRUSHCHEV'S OUSTER, WHEN BREZHNEV WAS IDENTIFIED AS THE WARTIME COMMANDER. IN 1956 AND 1967.

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HOWEVER, A SERIES OF ARTICLES APPEARED IN BOTH CLASSI-FIED AND OPEN-SOURCE SOVIET MILITARY PUBLICATIONS THAT SEEMED TO CONFLICT WITH THIS DESCRIPTION OF BREZHNEV'S WARTIME ROLE. THE ARTICLES REFLECTED THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND'S CONCERN ABOUT THE TIMELY PRO-VISION FOR COMMAND AUTHORITY IN THE EVENT OF EMERGENCY. THE MILITARY APPARENTLY WANTED A PREDESIGNATED SUPREME COMMAND IN CHIEF TO WHOM THEY COULD TURN AS A SOURCE OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AUTHORITY IN EMERGENCIES, AND EXPRESSED THE NEED FOR AN INSTITUTIONALIZED SUPREME COMMAND IN PEACETIME, CAPABLE OF TIMELY RESPONSE IN MILITARY CRISIS SITUATIONS. BREZHNEV, HOWEVER, WAS EMPHASIZING COLLECTIVITY IN LEADERSHIP MATTERS, AS HE STILL DOES TO SOME DEGREE. UNLIKE KHRUSHCHEV AND STALIN BEFORE HIM, BREZHNEV SEEMED TO SHUN PUBLIC IDENTIFICATION AS "SUPREME COMMAND IN CHIEF." FACT, A REMARK IDENTIFYING THE GENERAL SECRETARY AS SUPREME COMMANDER IN CHIEF DESIGNATE IN THE 1969 AND

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1964 EDITION OF SOKOLOVSKIY'S MILITARY STRATEGY WAS DELETED FROM THE 1968 EDITION. THE CONSISTENT IDENTI-FICATION OF BREZHNEV AS SUPREME COMMANDER IN CHIEF ONLY IN WARTIME, EVEN NOW, WHEN BREZHNEV IS CLEARLY IN A POSITION OF POLITICAL PRE-EMINENCE, CONTINUES TO HIGHLIGHT THE POLITICAL SENSITIVITY OF THE FOSITION.Y

THE NEW CLARIFICATION BY THE SOVIET OFFICER TNDICATES THAT BREZHNEV IS INDEED REGARDED AS THE WARTINE COMMANDER, AND THE CONSISTENCY OF THE NEW EXPLANATION WITH EARLIER INFORMATION INDICATES THAT BREZHNEV HAS BEEN SO DESIGNATED SINCE AT LEAST 1945. APPARENTLY THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF THE CONTROVERSY IN 1966-19670 WAS NOT THE NEED FOR A SUPREME COMMANDER IN CHIEF, BUT RATHER THE NEED FOR AN INSTITUTIONALIZED SUPREME COMMAND EVEN IN PEACETIME - 4.

THE CONTROVERSY SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN RESOLVED BY OCTOBER 1967, WHEN GRECHKO PUBLISHED AN ARTICLE STATING THAT ORGANIZATIONAL QUESTIONS WERE BEING

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DEALT WITH ALONG LINES ESTABLISHED BY LENIN AND

BASED ON THE SOVIETS' WORLD WAR II EXPERIENCE. THE

SOVIET SCC OFFICER'S REFÉRENCE TO THE STAVKÀ IS ONE

OF MANY FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES WHICH HAVE APPEARED

IN THIS CONTEXT SINCE 1967. THIS MAY INDICATE THAT

A STAVKA-LIKE SUPREME COMMAND WAS FORMALLY ESTABLISHED

BY LATE B1967. {SECRET}

2. USSR: THE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT OF THE CPSU
CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAS UNDERGONE SOME CHANGES IN LEADERSHIP.
A NEW DEPUTY CHIEF HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED, AND THERE ARE
INDICATIONS THAT THE DEPARTMENT HAS A NEW FIRST DEPUTY
CHIEF AS WELL. Y

THE NEW DEPUTY CHIEF, VADIM PETROVICH RUMYANTSEV,

WAS IDENTIFIED IN PRAVDA (JUNE 21, 1975) WHEN HE AND HIS

BOSS, POLITBURO MEMBER BORIS PONOMAREV, TRAVELED TO SYRIA.

RUMYANTSEV, AGE 50, SERVED AS AN ATTACHED IN DAMASCUS FROM

1951 TO 1957. RECALLED TO MOSCOW IN 1957 TO WORK IN THE

CENTRAL COMMITTEE APPARATUS, HE WAS FIRST PUBLICLY IDENTIFIED

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THE DEPARTMENT MAY NOW HAVE VADIM VALENTINOVICH ZAGLADIN AS FIRST DEPUTY/CHIEF. ZAGLADIN HAS WORKED AS A DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE DEPARTMENT SINCE AT LEAST 1967. THIS MONTH HE WAS ELECTED A DEPUTY TO THE RSFSR SUPREME SOVIET. NAHT ZWNAR REWOL ON ROF GEVREZER YLLAUZU NOITONITZIG AEM CHIEFS OR FIRST DEPUTY CHIEFS FROM CENTRAL COMMITTEE DEPARTMENTS. BEFORE BECOMING A DEPUTY CHIEF, ZAGLADIN SERVED AS A LECTURER IN THE DEPARTMENT AND LEADER OF A GROUP OF CONSULTANTS THERE-PROBABLY OUTSIDE SCHOLARS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS EXPERTS.Y

THERE IS NO OBVIOUS REASON FOR THE APPARENT REPLACEMENT OF THE MAN IDENTIFIED PREVIOUSLY AS FIRST DEPUTY, YELIZAR ILICH HE HAS NOT BEEN HEARD FROM SINCE NOVEMBER OF LAST YEAR -- AN KUZKOV. UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCE BECAUSE ALL THE OTHER DEPUTY CHIEFS HAVE MADE FREQUENT APPEARANCES. **ECONFIDENTIALLY**

B. CZECHOSLOVAKIA: THE NAMING OF ULTRACONSERVATIVE VILIAM SALGOVIC TO THE PRESIDIUM POLITBURO OF THE SLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY STRENGTHENS THE COMSERVATIVES' HOLD ON THE

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LEADERSHIP IN BRATISLAVA. SALGOVIC'S PROMOTION IS ALSO A

TACTICAL BLOW TO THE MODERATE FACTION OF THE NATIONAL PARTY.

HE IS REPORTEDLY A PERSONAL FRIEND OF VASIL BILAK, A LIKE-MINDED

SLOVAK WHO IS CONSIDERED TO BE PARTY LEADER HUSAK'S CHIEF RIVAL

IN THE LEADERSHIP. Y

SALGOVIC EVIDENTLY REPLACES THE MODERATE, ONDREJ KLOKOC,
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SLOVAK NATIONAL COUNCIL, WHO DIED IN MARCH.
NO SUCCESSOR TO KLOKOC'S GOVERNMENT POST HAS BEEN NAMED, AND
SALGOVIC MAY NOW HAVE THE INSIDE TRACK FOR THAT SLOT. THE DELAY
IN NAMING A SUCCESSOR TO KLOKOC SUGGESTS THAT THE MODERATES
LOST THAT POLITICAL STRUGGLE TOO.4

SALGOVIC IS ONE OF THE MOST UNSAVORY OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK

ULTRACONSERVATIVES. DURING THE 1968 "PRAGUE SPRING," WHEN HE

WAS DEPUTY MINISTER OF INTERIOR, HE SERVED AS A WILLING TOOL OF

THE SOVIETS. WITH ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF THE AUGUST INVASION,

SALGOVIC PLOTTED THE ARREST OF THE REFORM LEADERS. HE

REPORTEDLY WAS TO BE A KEY FIGURE IN THE ABORTED PRO-SOVIET COUP.

SALGOVIC'S OPEN COLLADORATION WITH THE SOVIETS IN THE IMMEDIATE

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ALONG WITH NUMEROUS OTHER ULTRACONSERVATIVES, SALGOVIC BEGAN TO RE-ENTER THE POLITICAL ARENA UNDER HUSAK'S POLICY OF "NORMALIZATION." SINCE 1970, HE WAS SERVED AS CHAIRMAN OF THE SLOVAK PARTY'S CONTROL AND AUDITING COMMISSION AND DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL PARTY'S CENTRAL CONTROL AND AUDITING COMMISSION. SALGOVIC IS NOW EXPECTED TO RELINQUISH THESE POSITIONS. & CONFIDENTIAL 1914

4. BULGARIA: LYUDMILA ZHIVKOVA, DAUGHTER OF BULGARIAN LEADER
TODOR ZHIVKOV, WAS NAMED ON JUNE 26, TO HEAD THE COMMITTEE FOR
ART AND CULTURE, WHICH IS ATTACHED TO THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.
SHE RECENTLY HAS BEEN ASSUMING A MORE PROMINENT ROLE IN
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, AND HER NEW POSITION—WHICH CARRIES MIN—
ISTERIAL RANK—WILL INCREASE HER PRESTIGE.Y

ZHIVKOVA, FORMERLY A FIRST DÉPUTY MINISTER OF ART AND
CULTURE, REPLACES PAVEL MATEV, WHO WAS SHIFTED TO THE
DEPARTMENT FOR ART AND CULTURE AT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. HER
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APPOINTMENT AND MATEV'S REASSIGNMENT SUGGEST THAT ZHIVKOVA HAS

BEEN CALLING THE SHOTS ON THE CULTURAL SCENE FOR SOME TIME.

MATEV'S TRANSFER COULD BE'A DEMOTION—SINCE HIS NEW POST WAS

NOT FILLED FOR OVER TWO YEARS.Y

THE REGIME MAY BE GROOMING ZHIVKOVA FOR AN EVEN MORE
PRESTIGIOUS PSOTION. SHE SERVES AS OFFICIAL HOSTESS FOR HER
FATHER, A WIDOWER, AND HAS LONG BEEN PROMINENT IN OFFICIAL
STATE FUNCTIONS. SHE ACCOMPANIED FOREIGN MINISTER MLADENOV
ON HIS RECENT TRIPS TO EGYP? AND WEST GERMANY, AND LED A
CULTURAL DELEGATION TO AUSTRIA EARLIER THIS YEAR.Y

ZHIVKOVA'S APPOINTMENT WILL PROBABLY PRODUCE
REVERBERATIONS IN NEIGHBORING YUGOSLAVIA. THE YUGOSLAVS LAST
FEBRUARY LAMBASTED HER FOR SAYING MACEDONIANS ARE ETHNIC
BULGARIANS. BELGRADE MAY VIEW HER PROMOTION AS A FURTHER
INDICATION OF SOFIA'S INTRANSIGENCE ON THE ISSUE. {CONFIDENTIAL}Y

S. ROMANIA: BUCHAREST IS FÍGHTING A REAR-GUARD ACTION

AGAINST THE IMPACT OF CEMA'S REVISED STATUTES ON ITS SOVEREIGNTY

AND FREEDOM OF MANEUVER. THE NEW STATUTES, AGREED UPON BY CEMA

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MEMBERS LAST JUNE BUT ONLY RATIFIED BY ROMANIA ON MAY 30, ARE INTENDED TO STRENGTHEN CEMA'S AUTHORITY OVER ITS MEMBERS.

ROMANIA APPARENTLY PUT OFF RATIFICATION AS LONG AS IT REASONABLY COULD.Y

THE MODIFIED STATUTES REFER BOTH TO USCIALIST ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION"--OPPOSED BY BUCHAREST--AND TO THE "GRADUAL
EQUALIZATION OF LEVELS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT," WHICH ROMANIA
FAVORS. THE ROMANIANS ARE NOW TRYING TO USE THE NEW LANGUAGE TO
BUTTRESS THEIR POSITION THAT EQUALIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT LEVELS
MUST BE A PREREQUISITE FOR MOVEMENT TOWARD INTEGRATION.Y

THIS BECAME CLEARER IN A RECENT CONVERSATION WITH VASILE DOREANU, A ROMANIAN TRADE OFFICIAL, WHO TRIEF TO PLAY DOWN THE "PRACTICAL" SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STATUTES. HE CLAIMED THAT NEITHER THE RATIFICATION OF THE STATUTES NOR BUCHAREST'S SIGNING OF THE CEMA "COMPLEX PROGRAM" REPRESENTED A CHANGE TIN ROMANIA'S BASIC OPPOSITION TO GRANTING SUPRANATIONAL AUTHORITY TO CEMA ORGANS. (CONFIDENTIALLY

L. YUGOSLAVIA: BELGRADE WILL PROBABLY SEND A DELEGATION

ANTERNATIONAL PROBABLY SEND A DELEGATION

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TO THE NEXT SESSION OF THE COMMISSION CHARGED WITH DRAFTING A FINAL DOCUMENT FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST CONFERENCE. A NEW SHOW OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY HAS PROMPTED THE YUGOSLAVS TO DECIDE. ALL. TO ATTEND THE WORKING GROUP NOW SLATED TO BE HELD IN EAST BERLIN NEXT WEEK.Y

ALTHOUGH MOSCOW MAS BEEN SUFFICIENTLY FLEXIBLE TO KEEMP
PREPARATIONS FOR THE FORMAL MEETING MOVING AHEAD, THE YUGOSLAVS
AND OTHER INDEPENDENT PARTIES HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE REAL
INTENTIONS OF THE SOVIET PARTY. THEY KNOW THAT WHATEVER MOSCOW'S
PRESENT TACTICS ARE, THE KREMLIN WILL TRY TO USE THE FORMAL
CONFERENCE TO BIND ALL PARTICIPANTS TO A FINAL DOCUMENT REFLECTING
SOVIET POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES. EVEN IF IT IS PRESENT AT THE NEXT
DRAFTING SESSION, A YUGOSLAV DELEGATION COULD DECIDE NOT TO ATTEND
THE CONFERENCE ITSELF.Y

BELGRADE AND BUCHAREST STILL SEE EYE-TO-EYE ON RESISTING SOVIET AIMS. WHILE ROMANIA WILL PROBABLY ATTEND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST CONFERENCE, IT WILL PROBABLY NOT SIGN THE FINAL DOCUMENT. BUCHAREST REFUSED TO SIGN SEVERAL DOCUMENTS AT THE INTERNATIONAL

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//THAILAND: TENSION IS BUILDING IN BANGKOK OVER PLANS BY THE <u>l</u>. NATIONAL STUDENT CENTER OF THAILAND TO STAGE ANTI-US DEMONSTRATIONS ON JULY 4- THAT POLICE ESTIMATE THAT 5,000 TO 10,000 DEMONSTRATORS MAY ASSEMBLE IN FRONT OF THE US EMBASSY, BUT EVEN IF THE ORGANIZERS CAN NOT TURN OUT SUCH NUMBERS, THERE IS A POTENTIAL FOR SERIOUS TROUBLE.//Y

//THAI MILITARY AND POLICE OFFICIALS WERE UPSET OVER STUDENT DESTRUCTION OF THE US EMBASSY SEAL DURING PROTESTS OVER THE MAYAGUEZ AFFAIR LAST MONTH, AND THEY HAVE PROMISED US OFFICIALS THAT SUCH ACTION WILL NOT HAPPEN AGAIN. ARMY COMMANDER KRIT SIWARA, WHOSE POLITICAL AMBITIONS HAVE UNTIL NOW KEPT HIM FROM SPEAKING OUT IN PUBLIC AGAINST STUDENT ACTIVISM CRITICIZED THE PROPOSED ANTI-US DEMONSTRATIONS DURING A PRESS CONFERENCE ON JUNE 24. KRIT SAID THEY WOULD CREATE UNNECESSARY MISUNDERSTANDINGS DETWEEN THAILAND AND THE **UZ-3//**4

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//NLAST MONTH, PRIME MINISTER KHUKRIT ASSURED KRIT AND OTHER KEY GENERALS THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO GET TOUGH WITH STUDENT AGITATORS, IF THEY THREATENED THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF THE US EMBASSY ON JULY 4. KHUKRIT IS NOW SCHEDULED TO BE IN CHINA NEXT WEEK AND TO REMAIN THROUGH JULY 4.//Y

//ALTHOUGH HIS TRIP MAY DEFLECT PUBLIC ATTENTION FROM
THE PLANNED DEMONSTRATION, THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY THAT
THE SITUATION WILL GET OUT OF HAND IN HIS ABSENCE. STUDENT
PLANNERS, WHILE CLAIMING THE DEMONSTRATIONS WILL BE PEACEFUL,
ARE QUOTED IN THE THAI PRESS TO THE EFFECT THAT THEY WILL
MEET VIOLENCE WITH VIOLENCE.//Y

//ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT UILL BE ANXIOUS TO AVOID ANY
EMBARRASSING INCIDENTS AT HOME UHILE KHUKRIT IS IN PEKING,
SOME SECURITY OFFICIALS MAY BE QUITE PREPARED TO CRACK DOWN
ON LEFTIST AGITATORS IF THEY BECOME UNRULY. (CONFIDENTIAL)//
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WESTERN HEMISPHERE BRIEF 099-75-4

HIGH OFFICIALS FROM ALL 24 COMMUNIST LATIN AMERICA: PARTIES OF THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES MET IN HAVANA FROM JUNE 9 TO LE TO DRAW UF A PLAN OF ACTION AIMED AT THE ELIMINATION OF US INFLUENCE SOUTH OF THE RIO GRANDE. THE PLAN, EMBODIED IN A DECLARATION RELEASED THREE DAYS AFTER THE CONFERENCE SCLOSED, IS INTENDED TO SERVE AS A GUIDELINE FOR ALL LEFTISTS, NOT JUST COMMUNISTS.

ALTHOUGH THE MEETING WAS UNQUESTIONABLY THE HIGH POINT IN THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY'S RELATIONS WITH ITS HEMISPHERIC COUNTERPARTS, IT WILL UNDOUBTEDLY FALL FAR SHORT OF ITS GRANDIOSE GOAL OF UNIFYING THE LATIN AMERICAN LEFT INTO A SOLID ANTI-US FRONT.

VERY FEW LATIN LEFTISTS ARE LIKELY TO BE WILLING TO ADOPT A PLAN OF ACTION FORMULATED AT A MEETING IN WHICH THEY HAD NO REPRESENTATION. ANY UNITY ACHIEVED AT THE MEETING IS LIKELY TO BE ONLY A THIN VENEER OF DUBIOUS DURABILITY -

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THE MEXICAN COMMUNIST PARTY DELEGATION, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD HARDLY REACHED HOME BEFORE IT DISOUNED THE PORTION OF THE DECLARATION THRAT CRITICIZED PEKING'S FOREIGN POLICY.

THE MEETING DID PROVIDE CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE THAT THE CASTRO REGIME IS FOLLOWING MORE CLOSELY THAN EVER A FOREIGN POLICY ALIGNED WITH THE USSR. THE CUBANS SIGNED A DOCUMENT THAT CONDEMNED THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS BY NAME AND SERVED AS HOST FOR A MEETING THAT COULD TURN OUT TO BE A PREPARATORY STEP TO A WORLD CONFERENCE OF COMMUNIST PARTIES, WHICH MOSCOW HOPES TO USE AGAINST PEKING.

FIDEL CASTRO PERSONALLY CRITICIZED THE CHINESE DURING A PRESS CONFERENCE LAST WEEK AND PRAISED THE DECLARATION'S ATTACK ON PEKING. MOREOVER, IN SIGNING A DECLARATION THAT TACITLY ACCEPTS THE VALIDITY OF THE SOVIETS' VIEW THAT VIOLENCE IS NOT ALWAYS NECESSARY, TO ACHIEVE POWER, THE CUBANS HEAVE GONE ON RECORD AS ABANDONING CHE GUEVARA'S CONCUMENT OF VIOLENT REVOLUTION.

THE CUBANS ALSO GAVE WAY TO MOSCOW ON THE NATURE OF DATE:
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THE CONFERENCE. STILL WARY OF THE DUPLICITY OF MANY LATIN

AMERICAN COMMUNIST LEADERS, HAVANA HAD WANTED TO INVITE A

BROADER RANGE OF PARTICIPANTS. THE CUBANS APPARENTLY HAD

IN MIND SOMETHING AKIN TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE LATIN AMERICAN

SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION HELD IN HAVANA IN 1967.

THEY WERE RELUCTANT TO INVITE SOME PARTIES WHOSE

ATTENDANCE MIGHT PROVE AN EMBARRASSMENT TO THE CASTRO

REGIME--THE GUYANA COMMUNISTS, FOR EXAMPLE. THE GUYANESE

DID ATTEND THE CUBAN CONCLAVE, WHICH WAS RESTRICTED TO

RECOGNIZED, PRO-MOSCOW COMMUNIST PARTIES.

THE CUBANS WERE NOT THE ONLY ONES TO COMPROMISE. THE HIGH PRAISE ACCORDED CASTRO MUST HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT FOR THOSE PARTY CHIEFS WHO HAD AT ONE TIME BEEN DENOUNCED BY HIM IN SCATHING TERMS. {CONFIDENTIAL} E-ZIMPDET.H

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